17 Feb 2026 - 21:49 CST
William Whipple’s surviving record does not read like a man who trusted atmosphere.
He was formed, first, by commerce and the sea: a Portsmouth merchant who learned that the republic’s “domestic” life is never domestic for long, because credit, shipping, allies, adversaries, and the price of risk all cross borders without asking permission. He was formed, second, by committees and campaigns: a Continental Congressman and militia commander who learned that legitimacy is not a mood but a chain of custody - of orders, jurisdictions, and written authority that can be shown, challenged, and obeyed. The Portsmouth Athenaeum’s finding aid for the Langdon-Whipple-Elwyn papers captures that reality bluntly: Whipple’s materials include correspondence, congressional committee papers, military papers, and financial memoranda - the paperwork of a man who understood that a republic runs on records, and that power without paper becomes power without restraint.
That habit makes him a useful lens for this year’s opening weeks, because what has distinguished the public climate since January 1 is not simply conflict, but the pace at which posture has changed - and the widening gap between how power speaks and how power is made answerable.
On the home front, the Minnesota flashpoint has continued to evolve in exactly the way a Whipple would recognize from wartime governance: escalation, public scrutiny, institutional friction, and then a visible effort to reframe command. Reuters has reported a “reset” in which Tom Homan was placed in charge of the Minneapolis operation, with Border Patrol “commander-at-large” Gregory Bovino removed from that role and reassigned, while operational guidance shifted toward de-escalation cues - instructions not to engage “agitators,” fewer confrontational optics, tighter control of encounters. If one reads this as mere theater, one misses the more important signal: governments do not shuffle command and rewrite field temperament unless they believe legitimacy is becoming a cost center.
But Whipple would not mistake a change of command for a change of condition.
He negotiated and administered under pressure; he understood that a system can lower its voice while keeping the same discretionary powers intact. In war, you can change the watchwords and still keep the same latitude for force. The question that matters is not whether Washington sounds calmer, or whether Minneapolis has fewer agents on camera. The question is whether the republic is insisting on what Whipple’s generation insisted on whenever force touched the citizen: clear authority, visible oversight, and procedures strong enough to survive the next emergency.
That same demand for examinable authority is now colliding with courts in ways the founders would recognize as the constitutional immune system doing its job. Reuters has also reported that a federal judge ordered the acting ICE director to appear and explain why he should not be held in contempt in litigation connected to detention-related disputes - an unusually direct insistence that executive power show its work rather than merely assert it. In Whipple’s world, that is not a partisan victory. It is the mechanism: a republic forcing an answer, on the record, when an agency grows too comfortable with its own discretion.
Yet Whipple’s lens widens beyond Minneapolis almost immediately, because he belonged to a generation that learned - in blood - that foreign relations are not an accessory. They are the environment in which domestic choices ripen into consequences.
Here, too, the opening weeks have been defined by leverage talk, alliance management, and the blunt use of economic instruments as signals. Reuters has reported on U.S. rhetoric and policy proposals involving tariffs aimed at Denmark, framed in connection with renewed arguments about Greenland. Whatever one’s view of the merits, the Whipple lesson is the same: when you use trade tools as geopolitical punctuation, you do not merely pressure a counterpart; you teach every ally to re-price trust. In the eighteenth century, Whipple’s America lived on credit and coalition; it could not afford to treat allies as incidental. Modern America is larger, but the logic of alliance is unchanged: reliability is a form of power, and it is expensive to rebuild once discounted.
The Pacific carries the same tension, expressed with different vocabulary. Reuters has reported on sharpening U.S.-China-Taiwan signaling, with Beijing’s posture toward Taiwan treated not as a local quarrel but as a systemic security risk that pulls in American commitments and regional calculations. Whipple would have recognized the underlying pattern immediately, because he saw it in the Revolution’s own diplomacy: small places become large tests when they sit at the hinge of credibility. The dispute is never only about the island, or the map. It is about whether commitments mean what they say when pressure rises.
So if Whipple were writing in the voice of these entries - not as a ventriloquist for modern policy preferences, but as a man trained by logistics, oaths, and the moral burden of command - his insight would likely be unromantic.
He would say: stop grading the republic by its tone.
A softer posture in Minnesota may be prudence or merely tactics. A courtroom demand for an ICE director’s appearance may be correction or merely the first round of delay. A tariff threat aimed at an ally may be negotiation or may be the beginning of a habit in which economic force replaces diplomatic care. A hard line in the Pacific may be deterrence or may become, if mishandled, the kind of irrevocable signaling that leaves no exit except escalation. In each case, the only honest question is the Whipple question: what is written, who can review it, and what happens when the system is told “no”?
Because Whipple lived through the moment every republic eventually meets: the moment when necessity becomes a solvent, and men begin to treat procedure as weakness.
His answer was not gentleness. It was discipline. Keep records. Clarify authority. Put command under scrutiny. Make the use of force legible. Make foreign commitments coherent enough that allies can plan without guessing what your next impulse will be. In other words: do not ask citizens to trust moods. Ask institutions to submit to limits.
In a year already defined by recalibration - by personnel moves, posture shifts, leverage threats, and courts forcing visibility - the danger is not only what happens in any single incident. The danger is the habit we train: whether Americans learn to accept administrative discretion as a substitute for judicial permission at home, and whether America’s partners learn to treat American assurances as provisional abroad.
Whipple would have called that a strategic and constitutional self-injury.
Not because conflict is avoidable. He was no stranger to conflict. But because a republic that cannot hold itself to procedure under stress will eventually discover that stress is permanent - and that the only thing it has truly normalized is power acting first and justifying later.
He would not ask us to panic. He would ask us to document.
And then he would ask the question his era learned to treat as sacred: when the pressure rises again - as it will - will the limits still be there, in writing, enforceable, and obeyed?
